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Abstract 
Experiences such as mind-wandering illustrate that cognition is not always tethered to 
events in the here-and-now. Although converging evidence emphasises the default mode 
network (DMN) in mind-wandering, its precise contribution remains unclear. The DMN 
comprises cortical regions that are maximally distant from primary sensory and motor 
cortex, a topological location that may support the stimulus-independence of mind-
wandering. The DMN is functionally heterogeneous, comprising regions engaged by 
memory, social cognition, and planning; processes relevant to mind-wandering content. Our 
study examined the relationships between: (i) individual differences in resting-state DMN 
connectivity, (ii) performance on memory, social, and planning tasks and (iii) variability in 
spontaneous thought, to investigate whether the DMN is critical to mind-wandering 
because it supports stimulus-independent cognition, memory retrieval, or both. Individual 
variation in task performance modulated the functional organisation of the DMN: poor 
external engagement was linked to stronger coupling between medial and dorsal 
subsystems, while decoupling of the core from the cerebellum predicted reports of detailed 
memory retrieval. Both patterns predicted off-task future thoughts. Consistent with 
predictions from component process accounts of mind-wandering, our study suggests a 
two-fold involvement of the DMN: (i) it supports experiences that are unrelated to the 
environment through strong coupling between its sub-systems; (ii) it allows memory 
representations to form the basis of conscious experience. 
 
Keywords: default mode network, resting state functional connectivity, perceptual 
decoupling, component process account, mind-wandering. 
 
 
  
 3 
Introduction  
Thoughts and feelings unrelated to the here-and-now occupy up to half of waking thought 
(Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010; Klinger and Cox, 1987; Poerio et al., 2013). Despite their 
ubiquity, we currently lack a clear understanding of how these complex everyday 
experiences are produced. Our capacity for self-generated thought allows us to think about 
people and places that are not in the immediate environment, a process hypothesized to 
depend on retrieving internally stored representations that capture memories of past 
episodes and conceptual knowledge (Smallwood et al., 2016). These unconstrained 
experiences can have beneficial effects, including creativity (Baird et al., 2012; Smeekens 
and Kane, 2016), the alleviation of loneliness (Poerio et al., 2015, 2016a), psycho-social 
adaptation (Poerio et al., 2016b), and the refinement of goals (Medea et al., 2016). Despite 
these benefits of mind-wandering, the experience can also derail performance on 
concurrent tasks (McVay and Kane, 2009).  
Contemporary accounts of mind-wandering suggest that it is best understood as the 
combination of different component processes (Smallwood, 2013, Smallwood and Schooler, 
2015). One component is the decoupling of attention from perceptual input that explains 
why mind-wandering is often linked with poor performance on external tasks. This 
component process is hypothesized to provide the mechanism that allows cognition to 
become independent of events taking place in the external environment. Support for the 
decoupling hypothesis comes from empirical evidence showing that evoked responses to 
external input are reduced during mind-wandering (e.g., Baird et al., 2014). Another key 
component process is the retrieval of episodic and semantic knowledge which is thought to 
provide the mnemonic representations upon which internal perceptually decoupled thought 
is based. In support of this, studies have shown that the hippocampus, a region important in 
episodic memory, is:  (i) active early during mind-wandering (Ellamil et al., 2016) and (ii) 
shows a pattern of enhanced connectivity with the medial pre-frontal cortex for participants 
who engage in mental time travel during mind-wandering (Karapanagiotidis et al., 2017). In 
combination, the processes of perceptual decoupling and episodic memory retrieval are 
considered necessary conditions for the self-generation of a train of thought unrelated to 
the external environment (Mittner et al., 2016; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). 
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Converging evidence suggest that mind-wandering is associated with a large-scale 
neural network known as the default mode network (DMN) (Allen et al., 2013; Christoff et 
al., 2009; Mason et al., 2007; Raichle et al., 2001; Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Weissman et al., 
2006). The DMN consists of cortical regions with the greatest geodesic distance from the 
input/output systems of the brain in visual and motor cortex (Margulies et al., 2016). This 
topological location may facilitate the expression of stimulus-independent aspects of 
cognition that characterize mind-wandering because these regions are thought to be less 
tethered to the input / output systems of the cortex (Buckner and Krienen, 2013). The DMN 
is also implicated in specific domains of cognition that are critical during mind-wandering, 
including social cognition, semantic and episodic memory, and future planning (for meta-
analyses see Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Spreng et al., 2009). As such, the DMN may 
support the contents of experience when the mind wanders. In line with this perspective, 
the DMN contains subsystems that relate to the two amodal long-term memory systems in 
the brain (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010b; Andrews-Hanna et 
al., 2014). First, the dorsal-medial subsystem of the DMN encompasses regions of medial 
prefrontal and anterior temporal cortex, regions implicated in the representation and 
retrieval of conceptual knowledge of the world (e.g., Jackson et al., 2016; Lambon Ralph et 
al., 2017). Second, the medial-temporal subsystem involves regions of medial temporal 
lobe, including the hippocampus, that are important in episodic memory (Moscovitch et al., 
2016). Both of these subsystems, as well as the DMN core, integrate information from 
multiple cortical regions that contain modality-specific aspects of experience such as regions 
that represent faces, places, words, actions, smells and sounds (Horner et al., 2015; 
Patterson et al., 2007). Neural substrates supporting episodic memory may bind such 
information into a single representation, while substrates supporting semantic memory may 
extract commonalities across experiences giving rise to general knowledge. These 
representational codes may be subsequently integrated into the core of the DMN based on 
its capacity to echo neural responses from across the cortex (Leech et al., 2012; Leech et al., 
2011). Given that the DMN has been linked to both the capacity to generate experiences 
that do not reflect the state of the external world, and memory representation and 
retrieval, its contribution to mind-wandering might reflect the decoupling of attention from 
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input/output systems during mind-wandering, the availability of memory representations 
that reflect the contents of our thoughts, or both.  
The current study used an individual difference analysis to delineate potential roles 
for the DMN in mind-wandering. Based on evidence of spatial overlap between patterns of 
neural activity observed in both task based conditions (e.g., Smith et al., 2009) and from 
studies providing evidence that individual differences in brain organization at rest are 
associated with the ability to perform a task mimicking those seen online during task 
performance (e.g., Krieger-Redwood et al., 2016), we used resting-state functional magnetic 
resonance imaging to describe trait differences in neural organization and linked them to 
trait differences in mind-wandering. We recruited 157 participants and measured their 
brains at rest on the first day of our study. On three subsequent days we assessed the 
content and form of their naturally-occurring thoughts in the laboratory in order to provide 
a relatively stable measure of trait-like mind-wandering. Next, in a subset of 80 participants 
we measured how they performed on a battery of tasks selected to measure core cognitive 
processes linked to the DMN (including episodic and semantic memory, planning and social 
cognition). We generated descriptions of the higher-order components underlying (a) task 
performance (what we call ‘Task Components’ – TC) and (b) self-reports produced using 
experience sampling of thoughts (what we call ‘Experience Components’ - EC). Next, we 
identified ‘Neuro-Cognitive Components’ (NC) by examining the relationship between 
different features of task performance and patterns of functional connectivity exhibited by 
the DMN. Finally, we used these NCs to identify the brain-behavior relationships predictive 
of the patterns of experiences that emerge during unconstrained thought. In particular, we 
were interested in whether brain-behavior-experience patterns highlighted a relationship to 
the potential contents of thought (e.g., patterns of memory retrieval, social cognition or 
planning). Alternatively, we might predict that brain-behavior-experience patterns would 
relate more to the features that allow mind-wandering to occur such as being internally 
focused or performing poorly on tasks requiring external engagement (e.g., McVay and 
Kane, 2009), which would speak to the role of the DMN in stimulus-independent features of 
mind-wandering. The rationale for this experiment is summarized in Figure 1. 
We were particularly interested in testing two features of the component process 
account of mind-wandering. First, that perceptual decoupling is an enabling condition that 
allows memory processes to contribute to thought content during the mind-wandering 
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state (Smallwood 2013ab). We therefore examined whether individual differences in 
memory performance were related to mind-wandering and, if so, whether poor 
performance on tasks requiring external attention would moderate this relationship.  
Second, that key component processes involved in the mind-wandering state (perceptual 
decoupling, memory retrieval – revealed by our TCs) are anchored by neural processes in 
the DMN. We expected that patterns of functional connectivity of one or more subsystems 
of this large scale network would be related to individual differences in mind-wandering, 
memory retrieval, poor external engagement and / or a combination of all three.  
 
Methods 
Participants and procedure 
One hundred and fifty-seven participants (60% female, Mage = 20.43 SD = 2.63; Range 
= 18-31) took part in an initial study where their resting-state brain activity and naturally 
occurring thoughts in the laboratory were recorded. A sub-sample of 80 then completed the 
subsequent task battery (64% female; Mage = 20.29; SD = 2.26, Range = 18-29). All 
participants had a resting state scan prior to any laboratory testing and underwent three 
days of testing during which we acquired descriptions of their naturally occurring thoughts 
while performing a simple non-demanding cognitive task. These measurements took place 
at the beginning of each session after which they completed a number of measures not 
relevant to our current research questions. These participants were compensated £80 or a 
commensurate amount of course credits. The subset of 80 then took part in a laboratory 
session lasting approximately 1.5 hours during which they completed the tasks described 
below in a random order (with the exception of the non-social semantic relatedness task, 
which was part of a previous battery of tasks). Participants also completed several 
questionnaires online prior to the laboratory session which are not relevant to the specific 
research question addressed here. Participants were compensated with £20 for their time 
or a commensurate amount of course credits. Ethical approval was obtained from the 
University of York Psychology Department and the York Neuroimaging Centre and the 
research was conducted in accordance with the Helsinki Declaration. 
 
Resting state MRI acquisition 
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Structural and functional data were acquired using a 3T GE HDx Excite MRI scanner 
utilizing an eight-channel phased array head coil (GE) tuned to 127.4 MHz, at the York 
Neuroimaging Centre, University of York. 
  
Structural MRI acquisition  
Structural scans in all participants were based on a T1-weighted 3D fast spoiled 
gradient echo sequence (TR = 7.8 s, TE = minimum full, flip angle= 20°, matrix size = 256 x 
256, 176 slices, voxel size = 1.13 x 1.13 x 1 mm).  
 
Functional MRI acquisition 
Resting-state functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging activity was recorded from the 
whole brain using single-shot 2D gradient-echo-planar imaging (TR = 3s, TE = minimum full, 
flip angle = 90°, matrix size = 64 x 64, 60 slices, voxel size = 3 x 3 x 3 mm
3
, 180 volumes). 
Participants viewed a fixation cross with eyes open for the durations of the functional MRI 
resting state scan (nine minutes). A T1 weighted FLAIR scan with the same orientation as the 
functional scans was collected to improve co-registration between subject-specific 
structural and functional scans (TR = 2560ms, TE = min full, matrix size = 64 x 64, voxel size = 
3 x 3 x 3mm
3
). 
 
Resting state pre-processing and first level analysis 
Functional and structural data were pre-processed and analyzed using FMRIB’s 
Software Library (FSL version 4.1, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Individual FLAIR and T1 weighted 
structural brain images were extracted using Brain Extraction Tool (BET). Structural images 
were linearly registered to the MNI-152 template using FMRIB's Linear Image Registration 
Tool (FLIRT). The resting state functional data were pre-processed and analyzed using the 
FMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT). The individual subject analysis involved: motion correction 
using MCFLIRT; slice-timing correction using Fourier space time-series phase-shifting; spatial 
smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 6mm; high-pass temporal filtering (Gaussian-
weighted least-squares straight line fitting, with sigma = 100 s); Gaussian low-pass temporal 
filtering, with sigma = 2.8s; 6 motion parameters (as estimated by MCFLIRT) were regressed 
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out; cerebrospinal fluid and white matter signal were regressed out (top 5 PCA components, 
CompCor method).  
Studies have highlighted three DMN subsystems (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010b; 
Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Yeo et al., 2011): i) The core of the network is focused on 
medial regions in posterior cingulate cortex (pCC) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and 
the angular gyrus (AG), ii) The dorsal-medial subsystem encompasses regions of dorsal 
mPFC, anterior and lateral temporal cortex and ventral, anterior prefrontal cortex, iii) The 
medial-temporal subsystem engages retrosplenial cortex, ventro-medial prefrontal cortex 
and parahippocampus. After preprocessing, we used the DMN maps described by Yeo and 
colleagues (2011) to drive functional connectivity analyses. We selected networks 15 
(medial-temporal subsystem), 16 (core subsystem) and 17 (dorsal-medial subsystem) from 
the 17-network solution. The parcellations were obtained in FreeSurfer surface space from 
hht://www.freesurfer.net/fswiki/CorticalParcellation_Yeo2011. After calculating the time 
series for each of these networks, we performed a functional connectivity analysis 
separately for each subject. The resulting maps were compared at the group level using 
FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME). These maps were thresholded at a Z = 2.3 
and whole brain cluster corrected p < .05 FWE. The resulting positive and negative maps are 
presented in Figure 2 and the individual maps were used as the dependent variables in a 
series of multiple regressions (see Results). To facilitate the transparency of our analyses we 
uploaded all maps produced in our study to a publicly available collection at Neurovault 
(http://neurovault.org/collections/2115/). 
  
Measures of Experience 
The contents of experience were measured using Multi-dimensional experience 
sampling (MDES) (Engert et al., 2014; Medea et al., 2016; Ruby et al., 2013a; Ruby et al., 
2013b; Smallwood et al., 2016). This technique uses experience sampling to periodically 
assess the content and form of a participant’s naturally occurring thoughts and experiences. 
In this case, participants performed a simple task that alternated in working memory load 
between a 0-back condition and a 1-back condition (see Konishi et al., 2015). Participants 
completed this task, which lasted approximately 25 minutes, on three separate occasions. 
 9 
We sampled experience on three days to minimize potential state-related influences on this 
measure. 
In both the 0-back and 1-back tasks, participants viewed different pair of shapes 
(non-targets) that appeared on screen separated by a vertical line. There were six possible 
shape pairings: circle and square, circle and triangle, and square and triangle (each with 
opposite left-right pairings). After a series of non-target blocks, participants were presented 
with a target trial requiring them to make a manual response (left or right arrow button 
press). The target was a small shape in the middle of the vertical line. In the 0-back 
condition, the target (e.g., a small square in the middle of a vertical line) was flanked by one 
of two shapes (e.g., a square on the left; a circle on the right) and participants had to 
indicate via button press which shape matched the target shape (e.g., left). In the 1-back 
condition, the target was flanked by two question marks and participants had to indicate 
which shape on the previous trial (i.e., 1-back) matched the target. There were eight blocks 
– each consisting of two to four mini-blocks containing either the 0- or 1-back condition. 
Each mini-block contained one target trial; the number of preceding non-target trials varied 
between one and six. Participants were informed of the change in condition (from 0 to 1-
back and vice versa) by the presentation of the word “SWITCH” that remained on-screen for 
five seconds. Stimuli presentation rates were jittered: fixation cross presentations ranged 
from 1.3–1.7 seconds, non-target presentations ranged from 0.8–1.2 seconds, and target 
presentations ranged from 2.1–2.5 seconds. 
Participants’ thoughts were sampled on a number of dimensions using quasi-random 
thought probes that occurred during the 0- and 1-back tasks. Participants received an 
average of 14.07 probes (SD = 3.30, Range: 6 – 25) during each session of the task. Probes 
asked participants to report on the contents of their conscious experience in the moment 
immediately preceding the interruption. Participants always rated their level of task focus 
first (“My thoughts were focused on the task I was performing”) from 0 (completely off-
task) to 1 (completely on-task). Participants then rated their thought at the moment before 
the probe on a further 12 dimensions (described in Table 1) that captured core features of 
experience. All ratings were made on a sliding scale from 0 to 1 and were answered in a 
random order. The analyses we report in this paper focused on the experiences regardless 
of the two tasks participants performed. We also looked for task differences but found no 
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evidence that the patterns reported in this paper varied according to the demands of the 
task. 
 
Table 1. Experience sampling questions used. 
Dimensions Questions 0 1 
Focus 
My thoughts were focused on the task I 
was performing. 
Not at all Completely 
Future My thoughts involved future events. Not at all Completely 
Past My thoughts involved past events. Not at all Completely 
Self My thoughts involved myself. Not at all Completely 
Other My thoughts involved other people. Not at all Completely 
Emotion The content of my thoughts was: Negative Positive 
Images My thoughts were in the form of images. Not at all Completely 
Words My thoughts were in the form of words. Not at all Completely 
Vivid My thoughts were vivid as if I was there. Not at all Completely 
Vague My thoughts were detailed and specific. Not at all Completely 
Habit 
This thought has recurrent themes similar 
to those I have had before. 
Not at all Completely 
Evolving 
My thoughts tended to evolve in a series 
of steps. 
Not at all Completely 
Spontaneous My thoughts were: Spontaneous Deliberate 
 
Measures of memory and cognition 
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Tasks were selected to provide a broad coverage of aspects of cognition and 
memory with an emphasis on elements of cognition that have been previously associated 
with mind-wandering and the DMN: (i) Autobiographical planning (e.g., Gerlach et al., 2014; 
Spreng et al., 2010), (ii) Social cognition (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Schilbach et al., 2008) and 
(iii) Episodic and semantic memory retrieval (Binder et al., 2009; Spreng and Grady, 2010). 
 
Autobiographical planning 
Participants completed a version of the Means End Problem Solving Test (Platt and 
Spivack, 1975). Participants were presented with six different social scenarios in a random 
order. For each scenario they were provided with an initial situation where a problem has to 
be solved (e.g., a person’s friends are ignoring them) and a desired end point (e.g., the 
person’s friends like him/her again). Participants were required to complete the middle 
potion of each social scenario providing means whereby the initial solution becomes the 
desired end point. For each scenario participants were provided with four minutes to write 
about the steps that they would take to solve the problem in each scenario. Responses were 
coded according to (a) the number of relevant means (i.e., the problem solving steps); (b) 
the solution effectiveness (defined as one that maximizes positive and minimizes negative 
short and long term consequences) (D'Zurilla and Goldfried, 1971) which was rated from 1 
(not at all effective) to 7 (extremely effective); and (c) the solution specificity (i.e., a detailed 
and specific problem solution) which was rated from 1 (not at all specific) to 7 (extremely 
specific). Each problem solution was individual coded and scores for each domain (relevant 
means, effectiveness, specificity) were averaged across each of the six problems. A random 
25% of the problem solutions were second coded by an independent rater; inter-rater 
reliability was calculated with intra-class correlation coefficient (two-way random). The 
reliability coefficient was 0.73 for relevant means, 0.46 for effectiveness, and 0.52 for 
specificity indicating fair to good interrater reliability (Hallgren, 2012)
1
. 
The MEPs provides information on how individuals plan the steps between from a 
starting social situation to desired end goal. To provide a non-social control for the process 
                                                      
1
 Due to the relatively lower reliability rates for the effectiveness and specificity scores we re-ran the PCA 
analyses excluding these two measures. We obtained three similar components with and without these 
variables and the components from each analyses were highly correlated, (component 1, r = .95, p < .001, 
component 2, r = .66, p < .001, component 3 r = .98, p < .001). Given these high correlations we report analysis 
using the more comprehensive PCA in this paper. 
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of planning, participants completed a computerized version of the Tower of London task 
(see Spreng et al., 2010). For each problem, participants were presented with pictures 
depicting three rods of different heights and three colored discs. The tallest rod can hold 
three discs, the middle rod can hold two discs, and the shortest rod can hold only one disc. 
In each problem, participants were presented with two pictures: the bottom picture showed 
the “goal” state (i.e., how the discs should be positioned on the rods); the top picture 
showed the “initial” state (i.e., how the discs are currently positioned). Participants’ task 
was to mentally plan the steps needed to reach the goal state from the initial state and 
indicate the minimum number of moves that it would take, with the conditions that discs 
can only be moved one at a time and that only the top disc on a rod can be moved. 
Participants viewed the goal state for five seconds and then the start configuration for up to 
15 seconds (or until they provided a response). Accuracy and reaction time were used to 
create an efficiency score where higher scores reflected fast and accurate responses.  
 
Social cognition 
We acquired behavioral measures of two aspects of social cognition: mentalizing and 
theory of mind. To assess mentalizing, participants completed a measure of perspective 
taking (Stiller and Dunbar, 2007) in which they read five short stories of social interactions 
involving a number of characters. After reading each story twice participants were 
presented with 20 true/false questions. Half the questions concerned facts about the story; 
half required participants to correctly infer the mental states of the story characters which 
differed in their levels of intentionality (the most complex metalizing questions for example 
involved tracking the mental states of all characters in the story). Fact and metalizing 
questions were ordered randomly, as were the order of the stories. Participants’ answers to 
each question were weighted according to their level of complexity (such that harder 
questions were given more weight) and then averaged separately for fact and metalizing 
questions across the five stories.  Participants also completed the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes test, a theory of mind measure comprising mental state attribution and complex 
emotion recognition (Baron-Cohen et al., 2015). Participants were presented with 36 
photographs of people’s eye areas, and, for each photograph, they were instructed to select 
one metal state word (from four) that best described what the person in the photograph is 
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feeling or thinking. Photographs and word choices were presented in a random order and 
were displayed on screen until participants responded or 20 seconds had elapsed (recorded 
as an incorrect response). Accuracy and reaction time were used to create an efficiency 
score where higher scores reflected fast and accurate responses. 
 
Memory 
We assessed aspects of both semantic and episodic memory since both of these 
have been implicated in the DMN (Binder et al., 2009; Spreng and Grady, 2010). To index 
autobiographical memory, participants completed an adapted version of the 
Autobiographical Memory Interview (Madore et al., 2014). Participants saw a random 
selection of six pictures (from a larger set of 18) which were used as cues to recall an 
autobiographical event from the past few years. Participants were instructed to describe a 
specific event in detail through their own eyes; they were given three minutes to write 
down as much detail about each event. Responses were scored using the adapted 
Autobiographical Interview scoring manual (Addis et al., 2008). This scoring system provided 
an individual score for each event regarding internal event details (i.e., episodic details 
regarding the event including place, time, sensory, and mental state details related to the 
event) and external event details (i.e., non-episodic details such as semantic statements and 
repetitive or off-topic details); these were averaged for each participant across each of the 
six descriptions. Descriptions were also given a rating of episodic richness (Levine et al., 
2002) to index the extent to which a feeling of experiencing of the event was conveyed; this 
was rated on a six-point scale. A random 25% of the event descriptions were second coded 
by an independent rater; inter-rater reliability was calculated with intra-class correlation 
coefficient (two-way random). The reliability coefficient was 0.89 for internal details, 0.86 
for external details, and 0.87 for episodic richness, indicating excellent interrater reliability 
(Hallgren, 2012). 
Participants also completed a semantic relatedness task to provide an indication of 
semantic memory performance. Since the DMN is also implicated in social cognition (see 
above) we used a task in which both semantic and social relatedness judgments were made. 
Participants were asked to determine the semantic relatedness between a probe word and 
three alternative choices only one of which was related in meaning to the probe. Each trial 
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started with 500ms blank screen and the three choices were then presented on the bottom 
of the screen for 900ms. The probe was presented in the top middle section of the screen. 
Probe and choices remained visible until participants responded or for a maximum of three 
seconds. In the non-social version of this task that consisted of 60 probe words for objects 
that were selected from a large database used in previous experiments (e.g., Davey et al., 
2015; Krieger-Redwood et al., 2015). The social version of this task consisted of 30 positive 
and 30 negative words describing abstract social concepts (e.g., impolite-tactless) adapted 
from Zahn et al. (2007). Accuracy and reaction time were used to create an efficiency score 
where higher scores reflected fast and accurate responses. 
 
Results 
Analytic Aims 
Our study aimed to understand the potential roles for the DMN in mind-wandering. 
To this end, we first identified latent components describing task performance and patterns 
of experience. Next, we conducted a series of resting-state functional connectivity analyses 
to identify the neural patterns associated with the DMN that described variation in task 
performance. Having characterized latent components in brain, behavior and experience, 
we examined if: (i) the experience components (EC) could be explained by individual 
differences in task components (TC) and (ii) if any of the patterns linking experience to 
behavior were also related to the neural components (NCs) that reflect patterns of neural 
activity that the DMN exhibited at rest that could be explained by measures of task 
performance. 
 
Identifying components of task performance and experience 
We decomposed the task performance measures and measures of experience using 
principal components analysis (PCA) to reveal latent variables that described these 
measurements. For the task measures (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics), the PCA was 
conducted using the twelve measures resulting from the battery of tasks administered. This 
revealed three Task Components (TCs) with eigenvalues greater than one and with a clear 
elbow after the third component observed in the scree plot. The three orthogonal 
components accounted for 61% of the total variance and varimax rotation produced 
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component loading patterns shown in Figure 3 and described below. We computed 
standardized component scores for each of our three components for each participant and 
used these as independent variables in the subsequent analyses: 
TC1 – Detailed memory retrieval – accounted for 35% of the overall variance and 
individuals with a high weighting on this component produced more episodic details and 
richer descriptions from autobiographical memory; they also performed efficiently on tasks 
involving the retrieval of social and non-social semantic associations. These individuals 
tended not to produce generic semantic information in autobiographical memory retrieval. 
While they were stronger on average at recalling autobiographical, social and semantic 
information, these participants were not stronger on tasks that involved encoding and 
planning (such as Tower of London) or encoding, understanding and recalling stories 
(weaker fact and metalizing scores), suggesting that this component did not correspond to 
the capacity to encode ongoing events, or to memory ability in general, but rather to the 
capacity to retrieve detailed and specific information. 
TC2 – Social problem solving – accounted for 17% of the overall variance and 
individuals with a high weighting on this component performed well on all indices of social 
problem solving. This capacity for problem-solving did not extend to a non-social domain 
(Tower of London). 
TC3 – External engagement – accounted for 10% of the overall variance and 
individuals with a high weighting on this component performed well on the Tower of 
London task, and well on both fact-based and metalizing questions about information that 
was described in the social stories. Notably, these tasks differ from others in the battery 
because they rely to a much greater extent on encoding information during the task (rather 
than for example being able to rely on pre-existing knowledge or experience). This 
component did not predict good performance on semantic or episodic retrieval tasks.  
 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of key task variables 
Construct and variables M SD 
Autobiographical Planning   
MEPS – Number of relevant means 7.60 1.83 
MEPS – Effectiveness (rated 1-7) 5.01 .85 
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MEPS – Specificity (rated 1-7) 4.63 .92 
TOL – (efficiency score – expressed as reaction time) -44.96 74.58 
Social cognition   
Mentalizing (expressed as a proportion) .76 .06 
Social facts (expressed as a proportion) .85 .07 
RME - (efficiency score – expressed as reaction time) -6.57 2.29 
Memory   
AM – Episodic details 20.95 5.36 
AM – Semantic details  2.37 1.67 
AM – Richness (rated 0-6) 3.81 .82 
Non-social SR (efficiency score – expressed as reaction 
time) 
-1.76 0.32 
Social SR (efficiency score – expressed as reaction time) 
 
-2.76 0.62 
Note. AM  Autobiographical Memory; SR  Semantic Retrieval; MEPS  Means Ends 
Problem Solving, TOL  Tower of London, RME  Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
 
We decomposed the experience sampling data at the trial level (for prior 
demonstrations of this approach see Engert et al., 2014; Medea et al., 2016; Ruby et al., 
2013a, 2013b; Smallwood et al., 2016). This revealed four Experiential Components (ECs) 
with a clear elbow after the fourth component observed in the scree plot.  
EC1 – Immersive thoughts – accounted for 26% of the overall variance and described 
thoughts that were detailed, evolving, vivid and habitual.  
EC2 – Spontaneous off-task future thoughts – accounted for 19 % of the overall 
variance and described spontaneous off-task thoughts involving the self, others, and future 
events. 
EC3 – Modality of thoughts – accounted for 10% of the overall variance and 
distinguished visual from verbal thoughts. 
EC4 – Positive thoughts – accounted for 7% of the overall variance and described 
thoughts with a positive valence that were not typically about past events.  
We projected these components back into subject space by averaging the loadings 
for each individual. This process describes each individual in terms of how much their 
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thoughts represented each of the experiential components. Heat maps describing the ECs 
are presented in the grey panel in Figure 3. Of these solutions, two (off-task thoughts 
focused on the future and the modality of thoughts) replicate those observed in prior 
studies that used a similar approach but a different set of questions (e.g., Medea et al., 
2016; Smallwood et al., 2016). 
Identifying Brain-Task Relationships 
Having determined the latent components describing our participants in terms of 
their task performance and experience, we next characterized the relationship between the 
behavioral dimensions and the functional connectivity of different DMN subsystems. We 
conducted three separate group-level multiple regressions in which individual loadings for 
each task component were included as between-participant explanatory variables and 
whole brain connectivity maps for each DMN subdivision at rest were the dependent 
variables. Automatic outlier detection was applied to minimize the impact of extreme scores 
in both neural and behavioral data. We examined whole brain differences in the positive 
and negative connectivity of each DMN subdivision seed region. We used a cluster forming 
threshold of Z = 2.3, and to minimize Type 1 error rates, we set an alpha value of p < .008 
FWE. This accounted for: 1) the number of voxels in the brain, 2) the two-tailed contrasts 
(positive and negative connectivity), and 3) the number of separate models (i.e., three – one 
for each DMN subsystem). Given concerns that the cluster forming thresholds used in fMRI 
analyses are subject to Type I Errors (Eklund et al., 2016), we re-ran these analyses using a 
more conservative threshold (Z = 2.6) and all of the observed clusters were significant at this 
level at the whole brain level (see Table 3).  
We found six Neuro-Cognitive Components (NCs) each reflecting modulation of 
either the connectivity of the core and medial temporal systems of the DMN by individual 
variation in one of the TCs. These are summarized in Figure 4 and Table 3.  Connectivity of 
the core DMN (Yeo 16) revealed three significant clusters; one cluster in the cerebellum 
extending into occipital fusiform cortex; another cluster in the inferior temporal gyrus and 
temporal fusiform cortex and extending into the cerebellum, and the third other in the 
lateral occipital cortex (in particular, the occipital fusiform gyrus). The first two clusters 
showed a negative correlation with TC1, indicating that high levels of detail in memory 
retrieval was related to greater decoupling between these clusters and core regions of the 
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DMN. The third cluster in the fusiform cortex showed a positive correlation with TC2, 
indicating that connectivity of the core DMN with this cluster was higher for people who 
were good at social problem solving. 
Connectivity of the medial temporal DMN subsystem also revealed three significant 
clusters: one cluster in anterior inferior frontal gyrus another cluster in middle temporal 
gyrus, and the third in superior frontal gyrus (including the dmPFC). These clusters all 
showed a negative correlation with TC3, suggesting that decoupling between these regions 
is associated with better external engagement. 
 
Table 3. Clusters showing a significant association between task components and functional 
connectivity of DMN subsystems at rest. The p-values represent the level of significance 
after correcting for the number of voxels in the brain. P-values marked with an asterix 
identify regions that are significant after correcting for multiple comparisons (p < .008), the 
† symbol identifies regions that are significant at p < .008 when thresholding Z = 2.6. 
 
Relationships between task and experience components  
Our analysis so far has described our sample in terms of components representing 
descriptions of self-reported experience, performance on the task battery, and the 
correspondence between task components and the organization of the DMN at rest. Next, 
we used these components to understand how the DMN contributes to mind-wandering by 
examining their associations across our sample. 
 19 
We used a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to identify whether, at the 
level of behavior, different combinations of the latent variables describing task performance 
accounted for the components of experience. In this analysis, the ECs were the dependent 
variables and the TCs were the independent variables; we examined the main effects of 
each TC on experience components as well as fully modelling the interactions between the 
TCs.  Two significant interactions were revealed by the MANOVA multivariate tests. First, an 
interaction between TC1 and TC3: F(4, 69) = 2.97, p =.025, η
2
p
 
= .15. Subsequent tests of 
between-subjects effects showed that this interaction was observed for off-task future 
thoughts (EC2), F(1, 80) = 4.95, p = .029, η
2
p
 
= .06). Individuals scoring below the median on 
TC3 (i.e., people who were less good at tasks with an encoding element and who were 
therefore potentially less externally engaged) showed a positive correlation between their 
levels of detail in memory retrieval and spontaneous off-task future thoughts (r = .39, p < 
.014) whereas individuals above the median on TC3 did not (r = -.19, p = .240). An 
interaction between TC1 and TC3 was also observed for positive emotional thoughts (EC4), 
F(1, 80) = 4.36, p = .041, η
2
p
 
= .06. Individuals scoring above the median for TC1 (detailed 
memory retrieval) showed a positive correlation between their levels of external 
engagement (i.e., TC3 scores) and positive emotional thoughts (r = .33, p = .038) whereas 
individuals below the median did not (r = -.19 p = .254). 
Second, the MANOVA revealed an interaction between TC1 (detailed memory 
retrieval) and TC2 (social problem solving), F(4, 69) = 2.81, p = .032, η
2
p
 
= .11. Subsequent 
tests of between-subjects effects indicated that this interaction was observed for positive 
emotional thinking, F(1, 80) = 8.55, p = .005, η
2
p
 
= .11. Individuals scoring below the mean in 
detailed memory retrieval (TC1) showed a negative correlation between their levels of social 
problem solving (TC2) and EC4 (positive emotional thoughts; r = -.54, p < .001) whereas 
individuals below the median did not (r = .18, p = .271). These associations are summarized 
in Figure 5. 
Having demonstrated associations between latent variables that underlie task 
performance and experience, we next tested whether similar patterns would be reflected in 
the neurocognitive components (NCs). We used the average parameter estimates that 
described the NCs generated by our functional connectivity analyses as independent 
variables in a MANOVA with the four ECs components as the dependent variables. This 
analysis was based on the full sample of 157 participants and revealed significant effects for 
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parameter estimates within two clusters for experiential components: 1) the cluster 
comprising the cerebellum extending to the inferior temporal gyrus and temporal fusiform 
cortex (i.e., the second cluster presented on the left hand side of Figure 4, and second 
cluster described in Table 3) (F(4, 147) = 2.44, p = .050, η
2
p
 
= .06) and 2) the cluster 
comprising the dmPFC (F(4, 147) = 2.50, p = .045, η
2
p
 
= .06). Tests of between-subjects 
effects showed that greater decoupling between core DMN regions and the cluster 
comprising the cerebellum was associated with more off-task future thoughts, F(1, 150) = 
8.18, p = .005, η
2
p
 
= .05. In contrast, greater coupling between the medial-temporal DMN 
subsystem and the dmPFC was associated with more off-task future thoughts, F(1, 150) = 
4.68, p = .029, η
2
p
 
= .03. Together, these data show that, consistent with the behavioral 
analysis, the patterns of functional connectivity associated with both TC1 and TC3 (detailed 
memory retrieval and external engagement respectively) both predicted the expression of 
off task future thoughts (these relationships are summarized in Figure 6). We also observed 
that more immersive self-generated thought (EC1) was linked to greater functional coupling 
between the medial-temporal subsystem and the dMPC, F(1, 150) = 4.09, p = .045, η
2
p
 
= .03, 
although since we did not find an association between these variables at the behavioral 
level we do not interpret this pattern any further. 
Finally, our analysis suggests that the pattern of poor task engagement is associated 
with a pattern of functional coupling at rest between the medial-temporal subsystem and 
regions of inferior frontal cortex, dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex and lateral temporal 
cortex. These regions are all elements of the dorsal-medial DMN subsystem as defined by 
Yeo and colleagues (2011). To quantify this similarity, we examined the spatial overlap 
between the pattern of functional coupling associated with task disengagement and the 
functional coupling of the dorsal-medial DMN subsystem (see Figure 7). This analysis reveals 
that, almost without exception, the pattern of functional connectivity from the medial-
temporal subsystem that was associated with task disengagement falls within the 
connectivity patterns of the dorsal-medial subsystem. This suggests that enhanced 
communication between these two subsystems of the DMN is linked to reduced capacity to 
perform tasks that rely on external engagement. 
Discussion 
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Our study set out to understand the contribution of the DMN and component 
cognitive processes to self-generated experiences that naturally occurred during an ongoing 
task. We used principal components analysis (PCA) to identify cognitive components that 
underpin performance on a battery of tasks which captured aspects of memory, social 
cognition, and planning. We also identified patterns of experiences reported while 
participants performed a simple unrelated cognitive task, identifying a pattern of 
spontaneous off-task future thoughts which correspond to a major element of the mind-
wandering state as measured in multiple studies, and across a range of different cultures 
(Baird et al., 2011; Iijima and Tanno, 2012; Poerio et al., 2013; Ruby et al., 2013a; Ruby et 
al., 2013b; Song and Wang, 2012). Across individuals, different combinations of task 
components explained cross-sectional variance in different dimensions of experience. In 
particular, off-task future thoughts were associated with a pattern of performance 
characterized by poor external engagement combined with detailed memory retrieval. We 
also found that these patterns of behavioral covariance were mirrored by patterns of DMN 
connectivity. Critically, off-task future thoughts were linked to greater coupling between 
medial-temporal and dorsal-medial DMN subsystems, a neural pattern that predicted poor 
external engagement. Off-task future thoughts were also associated with decoupling of the 
DMN core from regions of the cerebellum; a neural pattern that predicted better 
performance on tasks requiring detailed memory retrieval. These findings have a number of 
important implications for understanding the role of the DMN in unconstrained 
experiences, as well as for cognition more generally. 
First, our data provide convincing evidence in support of component process 
accounts of the mind-wandering state. These theoretical accounts propose that experiences 
such as mind-wandering are not the consequence of a single process, but emerge through 
the “interaction of discrete functional elements that serve specified cognitive processes” 
(Smallwood, 2013b, p.545). In particular, the process of attentional decoupling is 
hypothesized to lead to two consequences during mind-wandering: (i) it explains the 
association between the occurrence of mind-wandering and poor performance on tasks 
requiring external engagement and (ii) it allows cognition to focus on information that is 
generated from memory without retrieval being constrained by external input (Smallwood, 
2013a; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). Consistent with these accounts, our functional 
connectivity analysis demonstrates that the contributions of both attentional decoupling 
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and memory retrieval to the mind-wandering state have unique neural patterns. High levels 
of off-task future thoughts were independently associated with the patterns of cerebellar 
decoupling linked to memory retrieval, and a pattern of within-DMN connectivity was linked 
to poor external engagement. Moreover, our behavioral analysis demonstrated that neither 
poor external engagement, nor detailed memory retrieval, in isolation, were predictive of 
individual differences in mind-wandering. Instead, higher detail in memory retrieval was 
associated with greater off-task future thoughts only in individuals who performed poorly 
on tasks requiring external engagement. Together, these patterns of dissociation at the level 
of brain and behavior confirm two predictions of component process accounts of the mind-
wandering state: (1) that off-task future thought is related to multiple dissociable 
neurocognitive components and (2) that decoupling provides a mechanism that allows 
memory retrieval to contribute to the unconstrained experiences that occur during mind-
wandering. 
Second, our findings suggest that the associations between mind-wandering and 
poor external engagement depend on patterns of integration within the DMN; specifically, a 
pattern of heightened coupling between the dorsal-medial and medial-temporal subsystems 
of the DMN. This pattern is consistent with a prior study which found that the coupling 
between the temporal pole (a region in the dorsal-medial subsystem) and the core of the 
DMN was linked to individual variations in greater off-task thought (e.g., Smallwood et al., 
2016). Although our data suggest a link between these aspects of the DMN and poor 
external engagement, these regions have well-documented connections with the cortical 
input streams important for task performance. For example, regions of the temporal lobe 
that are implicated in semantic memory have been linked to both the DMN core and visual 
cortex via the ventral visual stream (e.g., Binney et al., 2010; Visser et al., 2012); similarly, 
retrosplenial cortex is linked to the DMN core and also receives input from visual regions 
(e.g., Vann et al., 2009). These dorsal-medial and medial-temporal subsystems of the DMN 
network can, therefore, act in response to external input (during encoding for episodic 
memory, and during object recognition and verbal comprehension in the semantic domain). 
However, our data suggest that they can also integrate information from each other, and 
that when they do so they may create a pattern of cortical organization that underpins the 
negative impact that mind-wandering can have on external task performance. 
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Third, our results suggest that the DMN can contribute to a range of different types 
of cognition by forming distinct modes of connectivity that are distinguished by their 
location on the principle gradient of connectivity (Margulies et al., 2016, see Figure 7, 
middle panel). One mode of connectivity reflects integration from regions of cortex 
specialized in unimodal representations of information into the DMN. In our study, 
participants who were better at identifying and sequencing steps to achieve a social goal 
showed stronger connectivity between the core of the DMN and regions in the occipital 
lobe / fusiform gyrus. These regions of cortex are close to the unimodal end of the principle 
gradient (for an illustration see Figure 8) and are important in the representation of people, 
places and scenes (Grill-Spector and Weiner, 2014; Kanwisher and Yovel, 2006; Martin, 
2007). This pattern suggests that one type of functional behavior that the DMN can exhibit 
at rest entails coupling with regions that are more closely linked to the input stream of the 
cortex and hence support forms of cognition that are “tethered” to either perception or 
behaviour (Buckner and Krienen, 2013). This process of integration may help to explain how 
the DMN can contribute to situations when external input is important for cognition (e.g., 
Konishi et al., 2015; Spreng et al., 2015; Vatansever et al., 2015). Our data also suggests that 
the DMN can form patterns of coupling that emphasize regions of cortex that are less 
connected to perception or action. Participants who were worse at tasks requiring external 
engagement exhibited the most coupling between regions located towards the 
heteromodal end of the functional gradient, such as the anterior temporal lobe and the 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. This pattern was associated with greater off-task future 
thoughts, indicating a potential role for integration at heteromodal ends the gradient when 
cognitive processes are reliant on memory generation such as during mind-wandering or 
mental time travel (Christoff et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007). 
Together these patterns of connectivity suggest that the contribution of DMN to different 
forms of cognition (e.g., those depending to a lesser or greater extent on internal versus 
external information processing) may emerge through the flexibility with which it can 
engage in different modes of cortical integration. At present, this interpretation is tentative 
because our data reflect individual differences in functional connectivity at rest rather than 
reliable connectivity changes during active cognitive processing, changes which may more 
accurately reflect responses to variations in the internal or external environment. Future 
research might address our interpretation more directly by examining the capacity of the 
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DMN to flexibly change its patterns of connectivity with different regions along the principle 
gradient during task-based paradigms. 
Our study focused on the role of the DMN in mind-wandering in terms of its 
selection of seed regions, and many of our whole brain results highlight regions that fall 
within the broader DMN. These data confirm the important role that this network plays in 
spontaneous states such as mind-wandering, a conclusion supported by a number of 
previous individual difference studies (Bernhardt et al., 2014; Karapanagiotidis et al., 2017; 
Smallwood et al., 2016) as well as the majority of online experience sampling studies (Allen 
et al., 2013; Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Tusche et al., 2014 although see Christoff et al., 2009). 
More recent work suggests that mind-wandering also engages regions outside the DMN, in 
particular regions important for the executive network such as the dorso-lateral prefrontal 
cortex (Christoff et al., 2016; Fox et al., 2015). These regions are thought to be important at 
different times in the genesis of mind-wandering (see for example, Ellamil et al., 2016) so it 
is possible that our individual difference method of analysis is insensitive to subtle temporal 
features of the experience emphasized by these accounts. Alternatively, it may be that our 
experience sampling battery fails to capture important aspects of the experience that these 
systems support. Consistent with this possibility, recent work demonstrates that regions of 
the executive system show stronger communication with regions of the DMN for 
participants who engage in particularly deliberate forms of mind-wandering (Golchert et al., 
2017). 
Finally, our study highlights a pattern of reduced coupling between the core of the 
DMN and regions of lateral occipital cortex / cerebellum that was linked to detailed memory 
retrieval, as well as to spontaneous off-task future thinking. Although component process 
accounts predict a close link between the functional behavior of the DMN core during 
processes such as episodic and semantic memory retrieval and states of off-task thought, 
based on our current findings, it is difficult to determine the precise psychological meaning 
associated with these patterns of neural coupling. Decoupling from the lateral occipital 
cortex may reflect a process of separation from input, hypothesized to support better 
memory retrieval (Huijbers et al., 2009). Previous research has also found spatial differences 
within the cerebellum in terms of patterns of coupling with the DMN for autobiographical 
memory retrieval (Addis et al., 2016). In our study the cerebellar cluster falls within a 
regions showing reduced connectivity with the DMN core (see the Neurovault collection 
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associated with this study). To fully understand the role of decoupling from the cerebellum 
and the lateral occipital, it will be necessary to record online neural data during both the 
process of autobiographical memory retrieval, and during mind-wandering, and examine 
how different features of these states are related to common and distinct patterns of 
functional decoupling between the DMN and these regions. 
Although our findings provide important insights into how the DMN contributes to 
mind-wandering, there are a number of limitations that should be taken into account. First, 
to understand the component processes of self-generated thought, our study exploited 
individual differences in neurocognitive functioning; that is, we examined relationships at 
the trait rather than state level, relying on intrinsic rather than task based functional 
connectivity. This approach is warranted since previous research has shown that mind-
wandering often shows similar patterns of associations using either approach. For example, 
similar trait and state results have been obtained in the domain of event related potentials 
(e.g., Baird et al., 2014; Barron et al., 2011) and mood (Poerio et al., 2015; Poerio et al., 
2013; Smallwood and O'Connor, 2011). Other work also highlights the overlap between 
task-based and intrinsic functional connectivity (Krieger-Redwood et al., 2016; Smith et al., 
2009). Nonetheless, there may be patterns that our study cannot capture, so future work 
should explore similarities between neural processing within the DMN as it occurs during 
both task-related states such as memory retrieval as well as during off-task states such as 
mind-wandering. Second, our decomposition failed to highlight a distinct component 
associated with social cognition. This may reflect our task selection or it may indicate the 
close association between memory and social cognition that has been identified by several 
meta-analyses of neuroimaging data (e.g., Spreng et al., 2009). Given the potential social 
functions of mind wandering (Poerio and Smallwood, 2016), future research might profit 
from a closer examination of the role of social cognitive processes in the mind-wandering 
state, using a more comprehensive battery of tasks that include measures of visual 
perspective taking (Surtees et al., 2013) and measures that distinguish the self from others 
(Macrae et al., 2004). Finally, one general concern with experience sampling studies is that 
the act of measurement may alter the nature of the underlying state, known as reactivity 
(e.g., Wheeler and Reis, 1991). However, we collected resting state data before any of the 
experience sampling measures were recorded, ensuring that the functional behavior of the 
DMN could not be affected by the act of monitoring experience. Thus, our demonstration of 
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the relationship at the level of brain, behavior and experience is unlikely to be accounted for 
by the hypothesis that the pattern is a consequence of thought monitoring (Konishi and 
Smallwood, 2016). 
In summary, our study demonstrates a dissociable role of the DMN in both 
decoupling and retrieval from memory, both processes that are hypothesized to be 
important in the mind-wandering state (Smallwood, 2013, Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). 
Our study highlights patterns of heightened functional communication between subsystems 
of the DMN that supports disengagement of attention from the external environment, and a 
pattern of cerebellar decoupling that affords greater detail in memory retrieval. In 
combination, these patterns provide the basis of a rich internal context that simultaneously 
takes account of episodic details from the past, and factual knowledge of the world gained 
through experience and which allows detailed retrieval of information from memory to be 
deployed on information unrelated to an ongoing task. 
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